{"id":41818,"date":"2017-12-19T02:24:20","date_gmt":"2017-12-19T10:24:20","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/world.edu\/?p=41818"},"modified":"2017-12-19T02:24:20","modified_gmt":"2017-12-19T10:24:20","slug":"climate-scientists-policymakers-need-trust-not-much","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/world.edu\/climate-scientists-policymakers-need-trust-not-much\/","title":{"rendered":"Climate scientists and policymakers need to trust each other (but not too much)"},"content":{"rendered":"

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\nAt a time when the effects of climate change are\u00a0accelerating<\/a>\u00a0and published science overwhelmingly supports the view that humans are responsible for the rate of change, powerful groups remain in denial across politics, the media, and industry. Now more than ever, we need scientists and policymakers to work together to create and implement effective policy which is informed by the most recent and reliable evidence.<\/p>\n

We know that trust between scientists and policymakers is important in developing policy that is informed by scientific evidence. But how do you build this trust, and how do you make sure that it genuinely leads to positive outcomes for society?<\/p>\n

In response to these questions, our recent Perspective in\u00a0Nature Climate Change<\/a>\u00a0explores the dynamics of trust at the interface of climate science and policy.<\/p>\n

We suggest that while trust is an important component of the science-policy dynamic, there can be such a thing as \u201ctoo much\u201d trust between scientists and policymakers.<\/p>\n

Understanding this dynamic is crucial if we are to deliver positive outcomes for science, policy, and the society that depends on their cooperation.<\/p>\n

What happens when there is \u2018too much\u2019 trust?<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Trust between climate scientists (researchers in a range of disciplines, institutions, and organisational settings) and policymakers (civil servants in government departments or agencies who shape climate policy) is useful because it enhances the flow of information between them. In a trusting relationship, we can expect to see a scientist explaining a new finding directly to a policymaker, or a policymaker describing future information needs to a scientist.<\/p>\n

Together, this arrangement ideally gives us science-led policy, and policy-relevant science.<\/p>\n

But as\u00a0scholars of trust have warned<\/a>, there is a point beyond which these positive benefits of trust can turn sour.<\/p>\n

Think about a hypothetical situation in which a scientist and policy-maker come to trust each other deeply. What happens if one of them starts to become loose with the facts, or fails to adhere to professional standards? Is their trusting counterpart more, or less, likely to identify the poor behaviour and respond appropriately?<\/p>\n

Over time, a trusting relationship may evolve into a self-perpetuating belief of trustworthiness based on the history of the relationship. This is where scientists and policymakers may find themselves in a situation of \u201ctoo much\u201d trust.<\/p>\n

We know that science advances by consensus, and that this consensus is shaped by rigorous research and review, and intense debate and scrutiny. But what if (as in the hypothetical example described above) a policy-maker\u2019s trust in an individual scientist means they bypass the consensus and instead depend on that one scientist for new information? What happens if that scientist is \u2013 intentionally or unintentionally \u2013 wrong?
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More trust is not always best. \u2018Too much\u2019 trust can cause perverse outcomes at the science-policy interface. Adapted from Stevens et al. (2015)<\/p><\/div><\/p>\n

When you have \u201ctoo much\u201d trust, the benefits of trust can instead manifest as perverse outcomes, such as \u201cblind faith\u201d commitments between parties. In a situation like this, a policymaker may trust an individual scientist so much that they do not look for signs of misconduct, such as the misrepresentation of findings.<\/p>\n

Favouritism and \u201ccapture\u201d may mean that some policymakers provide information about future research support only to selected scientists, denying these opportunities to others. At the same time, scientists may promote\u00a0only their own stream of research instead of outlining the range of perspectives in the field<\/a>\u00a0to the policymakers, narrowing the scope of what science enters the policy area.<\/p>\n

\u201cCognitive lock-in\u201d might result, where a policymaker sticks to a failing policy because they feel committed to the scientist who first recommended the course of action. For example, state-of-the-art climate forecasting tools are available in the Pacific but are\u00a0reportedly underused<\/a>. This is partly because the legacy of trusting relationships between scientists and policymakers in the region has led them to continue relying on less sophisticated tools.<\/p>\n

\u201cToo much\u201d trust can also lead to overly burdensome obligations between scientists and policymakers. A scientist may come to hold unrealistically high expectations of the level of information a policymaker can share, or a policymaker may desire the production of research by an unfeasible deadline.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s the right way to trust?<\/strong><\/h4>\n

With this awareness of the potentially negative outcomes of \u201ctoo much\u201d trust, should we abandon trust at the climate science-policy interface all together?<\/p>\n

No. But we can \u2013 and should \u2013 develop, monitor, and manage trust with acknowledgement of how \u201ctoo much\u201d trust may lead to perverse outcomes for both scientists and policy-makers.<\/p>\n

We should aim for a state of \u201coptimal trust<\/a>\u201d, which enjoys the benefits of a trusting relationship while avoiding the pitfalls of taking too trusting an approach.<\/p>\n

We propose five key strategies for managing trust at the climate science-policy interface.<\/p>\n